Alongkind | Verifiable AI — Public Evidence Sheet

Detailed run disclosures and summary files — V8, V7, V6 and V2

Latest evidence · 2 November 2026 · Separate deployed V8 candidate

Deployed authority, revocation and synthetic completion: one witnessed run

A private deployed gateway used real Firebase Email/Password identities and managed non-production Firestore. Twelve sequential cases and 24 action POSTs produced 21 native signed receipts and two synthetic effects. Explicit authority, grant revocation, duplicate rejection, outsider rejection and the shared-principal fence across two tenants were exercised through HTTP. The other principal completed independently. The operator provisioned synthetic fixture state and reported verified cleanup of 39 run-owned documents and both users.

Twelve issuer case receipts bound the report and deployment metadata. One witness POST returned HTTP 201. Witness signature, checkpoint readback and direct storage comparison passed with identical bytes. The uploaded public archive also passed its offline verifier in a separate environment.

Run: 124986ae-9597-4537-88f1-6e87b5edc86b
Revision: alongkind-gateway-v8-00001-wlk
Checkpoint: 666 bytes · recorded generation 1793639738103473
SHA-256: 689fce8786799c4f8a4cd1d047cc74b77ec371a12e60675ee6c508fd9965562b
Public ZIP SHA-256: 3c85d011e9021a0bba7ad2790852c718e8b8a561e019a5800644d0cac883448f

Bounded deployed synthetic scope. No new restart, crash, contention, client Security Rules or live provider test. General durable replay protection, commit-time Firebase session revocation, provider termination and release authority remain open. The Firebase-only in-flight gap remains and was not retested. The witness anchors evidence hashes, without independently attesting Firebase sessions, database observations, cleanup or deployed execution.

All historical HOLDs remain: the original unexplained immediate port-8085 rebind failure, both V5 runs, the earlier V7 bootstrap run and stopped V8 setup attempts. safeToRelease:false. This separate candidate is not a fresh execution of the full 207M-V3-E recovery chain.

Read the twelve cases and their limits · Download evidence and offline tools · Summary and fingerprints

Gateway signatures authenticate application-key statements. Verification of retained evidence is not an independent human audit or live reproduction. Storage generation and cleanup remain operator observations. Compare supplied keys with a separately trusted source.

Earlier evidence · 2 November 2026 · Separate V7 candidate

Managed lab Firestore: fences and duplicate markers survived worker restarts

Real Firebase Email/Password identities and managed non-production Firestore were exercised through three fresh application workers. Two workers were forcibly stopped after signed acknowledgments of committed state. Replacement workers compared stored records with prior signed state before new mutations. The offline verifier reconciled 28 native signed receipts and five synthetic effects, including retained fences and duplicate markers. The report records removal and absence checks for 53 run-owned documents, deletion of both fixtures and removal of the temporary encrypted signer.

Three issuer-signed phase receipts bound the report and cleanup inventory. One remote anchor POST returned HTTP 201; witness signature verification, checkpoint readback and direct read of the exact storage generation passed with identical bytes. The uploaded public archive also passed offline verification in a separate environment.

Run: da1e0144-e855-421e-833e-bd55add1f5f5
Checkpoint: 665 bytes · recorded generation 1793623247803307
SHA-256: 2c90c5d1808e78a5da7ecdf37341792ba80a5891ba8ca5641e6e1cb1f884c329

Trusted operator server-client scope. Application workers restarted against the same running lab database. Client Security Rules, deployed gateway enforcement, database restart/crash durability, host reboot, same-port restart and general durable replay protection remain unverified. The witness anchors evidence hashes; it does not independently attest Firebase sessions, database observations or process deaths. Offline checks do not rerun those events.

Original, V5 and earlier V7 HOLDs remain. The original immediate port-8085 rebind failure remains unexplained. The Firebase-only in-flight gap remains and its control was not rerun. Commit-time Firebase session revocation, live completion enforcement, provider termination and release authority remain open; safeToRelease:false.

Read the dated results and limits · Download evidence and offline tools · Summary and fingerprints

This separate V7 candidate is not a fresh remote execution of the full 207M-V3-E recovery chain. Verification of retained evidence is not an independent human audit. Earlier entries retain their original scope.

Earlier evidence · 2 November 2026 · Separate V6 candidate

Controlled emulator export/import: retained fences and duplicate markers

Real Firebase Email/Password identities and synthetic Firestore-emulator effects were exercised through three fresh emulator starts on distinct ports and two controlled export/import cycles. Imported records matched prior signed state before new application mutations. The offline verifier reconciled 28 native signed receipts and five synthetic effects. Fixture cleanup and temporary signer/socket removal passed.

Three issuer-signed phase receipts bound the retained report and export-manifest hashes. One remote anchor POST returned HTTP 201; witness signature verification, checkpoint readback and direct read of the exact storage generation passed with byte-for-byte agreement.

Run: 9e5786ed-d3f7-441c-83bc-8b50f3b059b5
Checkpoint: 665 bytes · recorded generation 1793614590273838
SHA-256: 8a4c80fcf8324026366664af5c56f1b0c2bd271c9f419855a0372a01e15f6078

Distinct-port scope only. Immediate raw binds failed after A/B and passed after C; no listeners were observed in the later samples. Same-port restart remains untested. Both V5 runs and the original port-8085 runner remain HOLD. V6 does not establish the causes of those failures. Crash durability, production storage durability, host reboot and general durable replay protection remain unverified.

Public verification limit: raw export files were rehashed locally before anchoring and export, but are omitted from the public archive. Its verifier checks the signed ledger, export-manifest bindings, issuer policy and witness signature; it cannot rehash the omitted files. The witness does not independently attest Auth or process observations. The Firebase-only in-flight gap, commit-time session revocation, live completion enforcement, provider termination and release authority remain open; safeToRelease:false.

Read the dated results and limits · Download evidence and offline tools · Summary and fingerprints

This separate V6 candidate is not a fresh remote execution of the full 207M-V3-E recovery chain. Earlier entries retain their original scope. Cryptographic verification is not an independent human audit.

Earlier evidence · 1 November 2026 · Separate session-fenced V2 candidate

Real Firebase Auth tested; coordinated fencing evidence remotely witnessed

Nine scenarios recorded seven acceptance cases, one coordinated race and a Firebase-only control confirming a remaining gap. Real Email/Password sign-in and held-token revocation used a dedicated Firebase Auth lab; completion effects stayed in the Firestore emulator. The offline verifier reconciled 42 native signed receipts and four synthetic effects, including the gap control. Both test users were deleted and cleanup checked.

The retained report was bound into nine issuer-signed case receipts. One anchor POST returned HTTP 201. Witness signature verification, checkpoint readback and direct storage comparison passed.

Run: 912c4d46-38ee-40f6-a168-6226e449f18e
Checkpoint: 665 bytes · recorded generation 1793562692548628
SHA-256: ed614eaf1c4ea2c35acb52a96d2f54d0db3434f8b6131e876df8f37e66eca099

Bounded result: a per-tenant fence committed by the application coordinator blocked the in-flight request and old-grant use after replacement sign-in. Firebase-only revocation that bypassed the fence still allowed in-flight completion. Global cross-tenant fencing, token rotation, restart recovery, durable replay protection, commit-time authorization/expiry, provider termination and release authority remain open. Live completion enforcement was not tested; safeToRelease remains false.

Original runner: HOLD. The unexplained immediate port 8085 rebind failure remains open. This separate candidate's port 8100 PASS does not clear it. The witness binds recorded evidence; it does not independently attest Firebase events or certify execution. This is not a fresh remote run of the full 207M-V3-E recovery chain.

Read the dated results and limits · Download evidence and offline tools · Summary and fingerprints

Previous: 31 October synthetic completion evidence. Older checkpoints below retain their original scope. Separate verifier code and a remote signature are not an independent human audit.

Verify a downloaded evidence archive

Extract one of the public archives above, open its extracted folder, then run:

python3 tools/verify-public.py

Requires Node.js and Python with the cryptography package. No login, private key or network request is required. Compare supplied public key fingerprints with a separately trusted source. A PASS checks retained signatures, chains, policy and bindings; it does not rerun Firebase, Firestore, worker deaths or remote storage operations. V6 raw export bytes are omitted, so public reviewers cannot rehash them.

Review performed 2 November 2026. Earlier checkpoints retain their original scope. The separate V2, V6, V7 and V8 candidates are not a fresh remote execution of the full 207M-V3-E recovery chain.